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1. Introduction
In many countries, in industries such as electricity, banking,
air transport, telecommunications, and postal services, public
firms operate in the same markets as private ones. To analyze
such markets, an extensive literature on ‘mixed oligopoly’ has
developed, recent contributions including Ghosh andMitra (2010)
andMatsumura andOgawa (2012). In this literature it is commonly
assumed that a public firm behaves strategically to maximize
either social welfare or a weighted objective function with
welfare as one of the arguments, while the budget constraint
is rarely considered. A different approach was taken in some
early contributions. Crémer et al. (1989) assume the public firm
is welfare-maximizing, but subject to a break-even constraint.
Furthermore, they note that their results would still hold for
a realistic ‘bureaucratic’ objective such as output maximization
subject to this constraint, a formulation which is suggested by
Estrin and de Meza (1995) to reflect behavior of public firms in
practice. However, the implications of incorporating free entry by
private firms into this framework have not been fully explored
(though Ino andMatsumura, 2010, analyze free private entrywhen
the public firm is welfare-maximizing). Free entry is empirically
relevant, given the trend to deregulation and privatization in
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industries in which public firms operate (see Florio and Fecher,
2011) and, theoretically, it throws up some intriguing results.
In formalizing the public firm’s behavior we argue that a key
role is played by the profit-constraint, so much so that the public
firm’s maximand can take a very general form, as long as it is
increasing in the public firm’s own output. This maximand is
general enough to cover a wide range of managerial specifications,
including maximization of total revenue, output, employment,
and the rate of growth of output. Compared to the objective
used in most mixed oligopoly literature, this formulation is
informationally less demanding to enforce, allowing decentralized
decision-making.
We show that the presence of a public firm is immaterial
for aggregate output and costs, and therefore for social welfare,
even if the public firm has a cost disadvantage relative to private
firms, provided the cost disadvantage is not too great. Several
irrelevance results have already been shown in the literature on
mixed oligopoly, including the demonstration by Matsumura and
Kanda (2005) that, with a welfare-maximizing public firm and free
entry, privatization does not affect total output or the output of
each active private firm. But our irrelevance result is based onwhat
we suggest is a more realistic formulation of public firm behavior,
and it extends further—to social welfare.1
1 Our irrelevance result is entirely different from that of White (1996), who
examines a model in which optimal production subsidies can be provided for
private firms.Economics Letters 1
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Our result arises through the balance of two effects. The public
firm produces at higher cost; but as it produces past the profit-
maximizing level there is a negative effect on the number of
private firms, and therefore on the duplication of fixed costs. For
the given range of cost parameters the strong policy implication
follows that there would be no welfare gain from privatization of
the public firm (or indeed from nationalizing private firms). We
then show, however, that for the same cost range, a monopoly
public firm would yield a higher level of welfare than either
of the alternatives, though we suggest that a monopoly public
firm may have drawbacks in dynamic terms. However, if the
cost disadvantage of the public firm is relatively large, a mixed
oligopoly is not viable, while an all-private oligopoly outperforms
a monopoly public firm in welfare terms.
2. The model
We consider a homogeneous-good oligopoly facing a linear
demand function,
P(Q ) = a− Q , (1)
where P(.) is unit price and Q total output. The industry is
populated by a public firm, indexed 0 and set P of n identical
private firms, each indexed p, with all firms entertaining Cournot
conjectures. We assume only one public firm because, as shown in
Bennett and LaManna (2012), the industrywould be unstablewith
more than one public firm.
The output of the public firm is q0 and that of a private firm is
qp; Q = q0 + nqp. The total cost function for any firm i is linear:
C(qi) = c iqi + ki, c i ≥ 0; ki ≥ 0, i = 0, p. (2)
The public firm chooses output q0 to maximize a function G that is
increasing in q0, subject to a break-even constraint. Thus, it solves
the program,
max
q0
G

q0,

p∈P
qp

subject to π0 ≥ 0 (3)
where
π0 ≡

a− c0 − q0 −

p∈P
qp

q0 − k0. (4)
The only restrictions that we impose on G(.) are that it is well-
behaved, that the second-order conditions are satisfied, and that
in equilibrium Gqo > 0. Denoting by λ and L(.) the Lagrange mul-
tiplier and Lagrangian, respectively, we obtain
Lq0 = Gq0 + λπ0q0 = 0 (5)
Lλ = π0 = 0. (6)
Given that Gq0 > 0, the break-even constraint binds, and it follows
that the public firm produces past the profit-maximizing output
(i.e., in equilibrium, π0
q0
< 0).
Note that the first-order condition (5) plays no role in
determining the equilibrium values of the program. Rather, it is the
zero-profit condition (6) that does all the work. To ensure that the
public firm can satisfy its break-even constraint, we assume that it
would be able to make non-negative profit as a monopolist:
a ≥ c0 + 2
√
k0. (7)
As is common in the mixed oligopoly literature, and is sub-
stantiated by a large body of empirical evidence (see, e.g., Roland,
2008), we assume the public firm may have a cost disadvan-
tage relative to a private firm. We consider two possibilities:ics Letters 117 (2012) 767–769
(i) c0 > cp = 0 (the private firms’ marginal cost being normalized
to zero) and k0 = kp; (ii) c0 = cp = 0 and k0 > kp.
Each private firm solves the following program:
max
qp
πp(qp) = max
qp

a− q0 −

p¯∈P,p¯≠p
qp¯ − qp

qp − kp

, (8)
given the free-entry condition,
a− q0 −

p¯∈P,p¯≠p
qp¯ − qp

qp = kp. (9)
From the first-order conditions for maximization of (8),
togetherwith (6) and (9), if there is an interior solution it is unique.
Denoting interior solution values by an asterix,
q0∗ = k0/(√kp − c0); qp∗ = √kp;
n∗ = [(a−√kp)− k0/(√kp − c0)]/√kp.
(10)
The condition for this equilibrium to obtain with at least one
private firm may be written in terms of a non-empty interval for
c0 (or, equivalently, as a non-empty interval for k0).
Lemma 1. A mixed oligopoly equilibrium exists if c0 ∈ [0,√kp −
k0/(a− 2√kp)].
The upper bound for c0 is given by setting n∗ ≥ 1 in (10); the
lower bound is the condition that c0 ≥ cp = 0. From (10),
∂n∗/∂c0 < 0; ∂n∗/∂k0 < 0. (11)
An increase in either of the public firm’s cost disadvantages reduces
entry. Higher cost parameters for the public firm lead it to produce
more so as to break even, and the negative impact on price causes
there to be less private entry.
For comparison, consider an all-private oligopoly with free
entry. Denoting values in this solution with a circumflex,
qˆp = √kp; nˆ = (a−√kp)/√kp. (12)
From (10) and (12), q0∗ + n∗qp∗ = nˆqˆp = a − √kp and c0q0∗
+ k0 + n∗kp = nˆkp = a − √kp. Thus we have the following
‘irrelevance’ result:
Proposition 1. For the functional forms (1)–(2), aggregate output,
aggregate costs and net social welfare are the same in a mixed
oligopoly as in an all-private oligopoly.
Despite the difference in objective functions between the public
firm and private firms, aggregate output is the same in the two
equilibria. Two contradictory forces drive this result. The public
firm’s higher costs leave it at a competitive disadvantage relative to
private firms; but the public firm’s maximization of a function that
is increasing in its output level acts as a credible commitment to
producing past its profit-maximizing point, giving the public firm
a competitive advantage. In equilibrium, the powerful effects of
free entry cause these two forces to balance out. It is worth noting
that Estrin and de Meza (1995, Proposition 5) argue, by verbal
reasoning, that (using our notation) n∗ + 1 = nˆ. However, from
(10) and (12), this is true only if k0 =
√
kp − c0
√
kp, which can
never hold if the public firm has any cost disadvantage.
Furthermore, despite the cost-function differences between the
public firm and private firms, the irrelevance result also holds
with respect to aggregate costs, and the immediate corollary is
that it holds for net social welfare. An implication is that, at
least for the canonical form sketched above, if a mixed oligopoly
is viable there is no rationale for either partial nationalization
(i.e., switching from an all-private oligopoly to a mixed oligopoly)
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or full privatization (i.e., switching from a mixed oligopoly to all-
private oligopoly). Note also that because private firms earn zero
profits in equilibrium, the proposition would still hold if these
firms were foreign owned.
However, another policy option for the government might be
to prohibit private production altogether (i.e., full nationalization).
Our second proposition considers the implications for social
welfare.2
Proposition 2. For the functional forms (1)–(2), with free private
entry (a) if a mixed oligopoly is viable (i.e., c0 ∈ [0,√kp − k0/(a −
2
√
kp)]) a public firm monopoly is welfare-superior to a mixed
oligopoly or all-private oligopoly; (b) if no private entrant could break
even in the presence of a public firm (i.e., c0 ∈ (√kp−k0/(a−2√kp),
a − 2√k0]) all-private oligopoly is welfare-superior to a monopoly
public firm.
Proof. see Appendix. 
We saw previously that for the cost range in which a mixed
oligopoly is viable, at the aggregate level a mixed oligopoly
merely replicates an all-private oligopoly. However, Proposition 2
specifies that, for this cost range, a monopoly public firm would
generate greater welfare. Thus, it is not public firm production that
causes welfare to be forgone; rather, it is public firm production
together with private production that causes the problem. Our
result complements the mixed oligopoly literature in which the
public firm is assumed welfare-maximizing. There it is found
that, with free entry, if the public firm has no cost disadvantage,
privatization (or nationalization) does not affect welfare (Ino and
Matsumura, 2010). With our differing assumptions, however, we
specify the extent of cost-disadvantage for which nationalization
is optimal.
Nonetheless, for the higher cost range in which a monopoly
public firm is viable, but amixed oligopoly is not, welfare is greater
with free-entry all-private oligopoly than with a monopoly public
firm. The higher cost level for the public firm rules it out as an
instrument for enhancing social welfare. If c0 is higher than the
ranges specified in Proposition 2 the public firm cannot meet its
break-even constraint.
3. Conclusion
We examine the equilibrium for a mixed oligopoly in which a
public firm maximizes output subject to a break-even constraint
and there is free entry by private firms. An irrelevance result is
established: if a mixed oligopoly is viable, then it generates the
same solution, in terms of aggregate costs, aggregate output and
welfare, as an all-private oligopoly. But we also show that for
this range of cost disadvantage, a monopoly public firm yields
a higher level of welfare. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily
mean thatmixed oligopoly should be ruled out onwelfare grounds.
2 Although Proposition 1 generalizes to cover increasing marginal cost,
Proposition 2 does not. This is because increasing marginal cost creates a bias
against a single firm (public in this case) compared to n (private) firms, for n > 1.ics Letters 117 (2012) 767–769 769
For we have abstracted from the potential endogeneity of the
cost function. Thus, for example, in practice, in the absence of
competition, the costs of the public firm might drift up into
the range in which all-private oligopoly outperforms each of the
alternatives in welfare terms.
Acknowledgment
We are grateful to a referee for very helpful comments.
Appendix. Proof of Proposition 2
Aggregate output is a sufficient statistic here for net social
welfare. From (4), the output of a monopoly public firm is [a −
c0 + (a− c0)2 − 4k0]/2 ≡ q¯s. From (12), the aggregate output
of a mixed oligopoly is qs∗ + n∗qp∗ = a−√kp. It is found that
[a− c0 +

(a− c0)2 − 4k0]/2 T a−√kp as
c0 S
√
kp − k0/(a−√kp). (A.1)
But, from Lemma1, amixed oligopoly is only viable for c0 ≤ √kp−
k0/(a−2√kp). Since√kp−k0/(a−√kp) < √kp−k0/(a−2√kp),
it follows from (A.1) that, for c0 ≤ √kp − k0/(a − 2√kp), q¯s >
q0∗+ n∗qp∗. Therefore a monopoly public firm yields greater social
welfare than a mixed oligopoly (or an all-private oligopoly (given
Proposition 2)).
For c0 ∈ (√kp − k0/(a − 2√kp), a − 2√k0] a mixed oligopoly
cannot obtain, but a public firm monopoly is viable, while, for
an all-private oligopoly, aggregate output nˆqˆp is still a − √kp. A
parallel argument applies to that given above. Using (A.1) and the
inequality
√
kp − k0/(a−√kp) < √kp − k0/(a− 2√kp), we find
that q¯s < nˆqˆp.
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